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PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: A
MYSTERIOUS ALCHEMY
Michael D. Schattman*
PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM
Roos EVELT THROUGH REAGAN. By Sheldon Goldman. New Ha

ven: Yale University Press. 1997. Pp. xv, 428. $45.
Each filling of a judicial vacancy is a minidrama of individual ambi
tions, backstage maneuverings, mobilization of support, and occa
sional double-dealing, and is affected by the values of those involved
in the process. There is human drama as political forces, events and
personalities intersect. And the end result is the staffing of the third
branch of government, which by its actions - or inactions - has a
profound effect on American lives. [p. 365; footnote omitted]

With these words, Professor Goldman1 concludes the lesson he be
gan nine chapters earlier as he embarked on his exploration of the
seldom-mapped territory where the American government sets
about building that smallest part of itself that has the most day-to
day continual contact with the American people. But I would hope
that the readers of this review and of this book would keep that
simple lesson uppermost in Inind as they consider Sheldon
Goldman's unique contribution to our understanding of ourselves.
INTRODUCTION

I have twice been nominated to the federal bench by President
Clinton. The first nomination, in December 1995, lapsed at the end
of the 104th Congress. I was renominated in March 1997. I have
never had a hearing and never had a letter from the Senate Judici
ary Cominittee requesting additional information. In 1995 and
again in 1997 the White House precleared my noinination with my
two home-state Republican senators. Originally; I was noininated
before the scheduled retirement date of the judge I was named to
replace, which gives knowledgeable readers an idea of the lack of
controversy surrounding my appointment. I had strong bipartisan
support. In July of 1997, however, almost two years to the day after
* Currently in private practice with Hill, Gillstrap, P.C., Arlington, Texas, Chicago, Illi
nois, and Little Rock, Arkansas. Judge, Tarrant County Court at Law No. 2, 1979-1983;
Judge, 348th Judicial District of Texas, 1983-1996. Nominated December 1995, to U.S. Dis
trict Court, Northern District of Texas. A.B. 1968, Georgetown; J.D. 1971, University of
Texas.-Ed.

1. Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
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I was first recommended to the President by the Texas congres
sional delegation, my affirmative blue slips were suddenly with
drawn by the Texas senators.2
For those readers who have no idea what withdrawal of blue
slips means, I recommend perusing Sheldon Goldman's Picking
Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt Through
Reagan. It should be read by every lawyer who wants to be a fed

eral judge as well as by those who practice in front of them. Much
of its importance resonates in the current political atmosphere and
can be seen in the increased attention given to presidential nomina
tions, judicial or otherwise, in both the popular press and legal
academia. This is due in part to the personal peccadilloes of the
nominees - consider, for example, former Senator John Tower's
lifestyle, which was so criticized by his fellow Republicans, or Zoe
Baird's failure to pay social security on domestic help despite two
large professional incomes. The nominee becomes a caricature of a
social problem and an object lesson for the public.
It is also important to a growing understanding of the role these
once-anonymous persons play in the life of the Republic and in the
lives of each of us. This latter realization may account for the
proliferation of scholarly articles devoted to the nomination process
that have appeared in the last few years.3 These articles, however,
are not likely to be read widely even in legal circles. Goldman's
book provides information to lawyers, judges, the press, and the
general public in an anecdotal format and with an astounding
2. See Neil A. Lewis, Jilted Texas Judge Takes on His Foes in Partisan Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997, at 1; Henry Weinstein, Drive Seeks to Block Clinton Judicial Nominees,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at A3. These articles discuss the political nature of the stall placed
upon President Clinton's nominees and efforts by right-wing groups to involve Republican
senators in their fundraising projects by linking them to blocking federal judicial
nominations.
3. Some articles of interest include: Richard S. Arnold, Judicial Politics Under President
Washington, 38 Aruz. L. REv. 473 (1996); Kim Dayton, Judicial Vacancies and Delay in the
Federal Courts: An Empirical Evaluation, 61 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 757 (1993); John M. de
Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. & EcoN. 435 (1996);
Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74 JUDICA
TURE 294 (1991); Orrin G. Hatch, The Politics of Picking Judges, 6 J .L. & PoL. 35 (1989);
Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 699 (1995);
R. Samuel Paz, Federal District Court Nomination Process: Smears of Controversy and Ideo
logical Sentinels, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 903 (1995); Wm. Bradford Reynolds, The Confirma
tion Process: Too Much Advice and Too Little Consent, 15 JUDICATURE 80 (1991);
Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court-Packing Ef
forts of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 51 ALB. L. REv. 1111 (1994); Carl Tobias, Filling the
Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REv. 309 (1996); Carl Tobias, Rethinking
Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 BYU L. REv. 1257; Oona A. Hathaway, The Politics of the
Confirmation Process, 106 YALE L.J. 235 (1996) (book review); Orrin G. Hatch, Making a
Real Mess, 1995 PUB. INTEREST L. REv. 139 (book review); Gary A. Hengstler, At the Seat of
Power, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 70; Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U.
Cm. L. REv. 919 (1995) (book review); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straightening Out Tue Con
firmation Mess,

105

YALE LJ

549 (1995)

(book review).
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amount of insider detail - including handwritten notes between
presidents and their confidants.4 He spends little time on well
covered Supreme Court nominations, concentrating as his subtitle
says on lower court selection.
Goldman's book is a work of political science, and it is short on
the historical context that would be useful to interpret the tables
located throughout the text. In fact, it does not tell you nearly
enough about blue slips.5 But it certainly will allow you to refute
the common misconception that the politicization of nominations
started with Judge Bork.
I wish to settle that bit of historical inaccuracy first: politiciza
tion of the process of selecting federal judges has been around for a
long time. Less than two years after Truman became president
upon the death of Roosevelt, the Republicans gained control of the
Congress. Wisconsin Senator Alexander Wiley headed the Senate
Judiciary Committee. According to Goldman, Senator Wiley an
nounced even before he assumed the chairmanship that the Senate
worild confirm no "leftists" (p. 81). Soon after, he stated he wanted
a political balance in appointments-that is, more Republicans.
Next, he proclaimed his opposition to any New Dealers. His com
mittee held up nominations and the number of confirmations began
to drop: sixteen in 1946 when the Democrats were in control, ten in
1947 under the party opposite the president, and in 1948, anticipat
ing President Dewey, the total confirmed by the Republican
controlled Senate dropped to three (p. 81).
I cannot say, for this is not a history book, whether this strategy
led to the appellation "do-nothing Congress" and the triumph of
Harry Truman. It was, however, nearly fifty years before the coun
try chose again to have a Democratic President paired with a Re
publican Senate. It is somewhat surprising, given the previous
results, that the Republican leadership would resurrect Senator
4. In filling a vacancy on the Third Circuit, Roosevelt wrote at the bottom of a memo
recommending one candidate named Jones, "Guffey backing MM," indicating Senator
Guffey's endorsement of a different candidate, Musmanno. Roosevelt then turned around
and, after applying personal charm and pressure, appointed a third man who did not want the
judgeship but who was the President's choice. P. 28.
5. The blue slip was the extra-constitutional administrative convenience adopted early in
the Eisenhower presidency as a way for home-state senators to indicate their support of or
opposition to a nomination. It gives the committee chair a way to be advised in a nonpublic
manner of the private views of a colleague. The blue slip only has the force the committee
chair is willing to give to it, although there have been attempts to give it greater effect by
resolutions of party conferences in the Senate. It is not to be confused with a "hold," which
is a sort of secret club blackball that allows any senator to block a vote on a nominee from
any state for any office for any reason or no reason by simply advising the majority leader
that s/he desires to hold the nomination. Both practices have been criticized. See, e.g.,
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JumcIAL PROCESS 23-24 (6th ed. 1993); GEORGE C. EDWARDS III
& STEPHEN J. WAYNE, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: PoLmcs AND POLICY MAKING (4th ed.
1997).
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Wiley's old playbook. Yet here we are today, hearing almost the
same words and watching the same damming up of the process.
Contrast this approach to Goldman's account of the Demo
cratic-controlled Senate's approach to President Nixon's judicial
nominees as impeachment and resignation loomed. As August
1974 began, only one of Nixon's judicial appointees remained pend
ing. Then, on August 8, his last full day in office, Richard Nixon
nominated three more judges. All four of his final nominees were
confirmed (p. 226).
As Professor Goldman makes obvious to the diligent reader,
there is no need for Wiley-like behavior.6 This system designed by
our Founding Fathers is so evenly balanced that by 1961, after
twenty years of Roosevelt-Truman followed by only eight years of
Eisenhower, the federal judiciary was evenly split between Demo
crat and Republican office holders (p. 157). This is despite the fact
that the Senate had a Democratic majority for twenty-two of those
twenty-eight years, including the final four opposite Eisenhower. It
is an excellent example of letting the political market take its course
without deliberate interference. Individual candidates should be
reviewed on the merits. That is what the Constitution demands and
expects. Those who would deliberately interfere with the process in
order to limit the total output are selfish and reckless. They ru:e
selfish because deliberate interference is a bullying tactic adopted
by sore losers that says in effect: you won but you can't have the
prize. They are reckless on two bases. On a narrow basis, this strat
egy led the Republicans to defeat in 1948. On a wider basis, it in
terferes with the natural pendulum swing of free ideas which has
protected our nation from the upheavals so common in other
democracies.

6. We are experiencing this mindless partisan resistance once again and it is hurting the
selection process and crippling the courts. In his year-end report, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist noted how these partisan divisions and the Senate's inordinate delay in acting on
nominations were leaving the judiciary shorthanded. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1997 YEAR
END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Jan. 1, 1998). The news media has responded to
the harm caused by this delay and focused on the federal courts' productivity as at no other
time. One article noted that in 1990, retired judges handled 3049, or 14.6% of the 20,836
federal trials. By 1997, the total number of trials was down to 17,266 yet trials presided over
by the senior federal judges had risen to 3524 (or 20.4% ). Pekkanen & Gill , Judicial Vacan
cies Force Delays Create Case Backlog, THE DETROIT NEws, Feb. 8, 1998, at AS. In the U.S.
Senate, Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy (D) has responded by introducing the "Judicial
Emergency Responsibility Act," which would prevent lengthy Senate recesses and require
the Senate to act on judicial nominations within 60 days during any declared judicial emer
gency. S. 1906, 105th Cong. (1998).
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A state without the means of some change is without the means of its
conservation.
- Edmund Burke7

PERSPECTIVE

The best way to approach this book is to use the same roadmap
as Professor Goldman - the successive presidential administra
tions that have introduced judicial nominees to the Senate and the
people. He does so in nine chapters, with the first giving a general
overview from 1789 to 1933. Seven chapters follow analyzing the
selection process and criteria by each administration from
Roosevelt to Reagan (Kennedy and Johnson are considered in one
chapter, as are Nixon and Ford). The final chapter reprises what
has gone before and then, for scholars or the incurably curious, a
concise note on the sources available to most anyone, and finally
forty-two pages of excellent detailed notes. I shall follow the same
route and take the chapters and presidents in order.
While the opening chapter in Goldman's book is entitled "Judi
cial Selection in Theoretical and Historical Perspective," it is really
more a description of his personal framework for reading a presi
dent's mind. He describes three presidential agendas: policy, parti
san, and personal (p. 3). The policy agenda is "the substantive
policy goals of an administration." The partisan agenda is
Goldman's shorthand for the use of power "to shore up political
support for the president or for the party." Finally, the chief execu
tive's personal agenda is not surprisingly defined as his use of "dis
cretion to favor a personal friend or associate." From time to time
in later passages the author reminds the reader of these concepts as
he discusses the making or unmaking of a particular nomination or
how one agenda was served by another. The problem with the
agenda concept is that some presidents delegated this job almost
completely. Furthermore, the relative value Goldman places on
these distinctions is apparently low since there is no chart referenc
ing or cross-referencing this information. It appears sporadically in
the text and not in the final summations.
Goldman uses historical perspective to mean a summary of the
period between the Constitutional Convention and Herbert Hoover
- that is, the time prior to the start of Goldman's research. Per
haps because I majored in history and have made it a lifelong pas
sion, I craved historical perspective. It is difficult to determine
what any president was thinking, policy versus party interests, if you
cannot put decisions into the context of the issues of the times and
7. THE

OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QuoTATIONS 111 (3d ed. 1979).
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the place. If this book is ever updated it ought to be coauthored by
a historian.
ROOSEVELT
Franklin Roosevelt's meticulous attention to the slightest detail
and his apparent delight in manipulating the pieces on the chess
board are the hallmarks of his selection of judges for the federal
bench. If the author's agenda analysis is helpful at all, it is perhaps
most helpful here in appreciating Roosevelt's understanding of how
the three tracks can be used all the time. FDR was quick to see that
the old men on the Supreme Court could prevent the reforms he
had conceived to rescue the nation from depression and revolution.
He was quick to see a solution and to push it despite the cautions
from his close advisers. When public opposition forced the Con
gress to reject his court-packing plan, Roosevelt quickly adapted.
The natural attrition of death and retirement soon allowed his nom
inees to become members of the Nine. In tum he directed his at
tention to the lower courts and their impact on his policies.
Although the author does not discuss the question, it may be
that FDR's experience as a governor of a state with a judiciary that
was entirely elected helped to inform his approach to picking
judges. He understood the nuances of filling vacancies and satisfy
ing the patronage needs of an individual senator from his New York
experience. But here on the larger stage he saw a broader picture
and sought nominees who would help fill out the canvas. Conse
quently, as Goldman makes clear, he took an active role in looking
for and screening the nominees sent to him. FDR understood that
senators had both partisan and personal agendas that he could use
to his advantage. Still, he was cautious. While he attempted to
meet the needs of specific New Deal constituencies such as minori
ties and women, he did not act so precipitately that he alienated
another part of the coalition, whether southern senators or city
bosses, on a specific nomination. Numerically, he succeeded in
placing the first woman on a federal court of general jurisdiction Florence Allen on the Sixth Circuit - and the first black on a fed
eral district bench - William Hastie in the Virgin Islands (pp. 5157). Roosevelt found that his discretion was circumscribed by the
Senate as well as by his own desire to achieve his other broader
policy goals.
TRUMAN

Coming into the presidency as he did, Harry Truman carried on
where Roosevelt left off. This is true of his judicial appointments as
well. If there was a honeymoon for the man who found himself
facing Stalin at Potsdam and making the decision to drop the
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atomic bomb, it was not in the area of picking judges. In office for
a week, he was visited by the senators from North Carolina to dis
cuss judgeships in that state (p. 68).
More a political figure than a national one like Roosevelt, the
former senator was more deferential to the wants and desires of
senators - even Republican senators - than his predecessor. Yet
he came to understand the prerogatives of his new office and to
guard them stubbornly if need be. Like Roosevelt, Truman worked
through his Attorney General and the Democratic National Com
mittee chair on judicial appointments. Unlike Roosevelt, Truman
was more of a hands-off president and rarely attempted to
micromanage the process of finding, selecting, vetting, appointing,
and confirming his judges (p. 69). He did pay close attention to
what happened in his home state of Missouri even as its political
leaders and its senators worked names through the system.
Truman's appreciation for patronage and party building seems
to have smoothed much of his appointment road, but there were
some exceptions. In Georgia, Truman elevated the brother of Sena
tor Russell to the Fifth Circuit, but then he and the Senator dis
agreed over the brother's successor. Finally, after a long fight the
two men met and Truman agreed to Russell's choice (pp. 71-72). In
Vermont, Truman fought and won a behind-the-scenes battle with
the Vermont Democratic Party leadership to name a Republican
and former senator to a federal district court in that state (p. 69).
The Vermont Democrats were focusing on party building and
Truman on naming a man he knew and respected, regardless of
party.
An intra-party fight among California's Democrats illustrates
the problem of state-by-state selection that drove President Carter
years later to try to rationalize and systematize the process on a
national basis. Party factions in California were at loggerheads on
potential nominees for two district court vacancies. The party or
ganization had its choices and the state's senior senator had his
own. Stalemate set in for over a year and each attempt by Truman
to make peace ended in failure, if not renewed acrimony. Finally,
illness forced the senator's retirement and Truman was able to
make his own choice - one from each faction (pp. 72-73).
With the Republican victory in the 1946 congressional elections,
Truman faced a hostile Senate and a Republican majority confident
that the president was irrelevant. The result was the program of
Senator Wiley mentioned above - no leftists, no New Dealers,
more Republicans and in the end almost no confirmations (p. 81).
Determined to block the appointment of women and blacks, Sena
tor Wiley brought the American Bar Association into the process to
screen and give its evaluation of nominees - previously the func-

May 1998]

Picking Judges

1585

tion of the Justice Department and the FBI (pp. 86-88). Wiley's
plan worked. Even after Truman's victory in 1948, the ABA's par
ticipation ensured that by the end of his term he had named only
one woman, Burnita Matthews of Mississippi backed by Senators
Eastland and Stennis, to the federal district court. He also elevated
William Hastie to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (pp.

96-97, 100-01).

On the public policy front, Truman carried to completion the
legislative programs of the New Deal and began civil rights initia
tives, but this seems unconnected to his judicial appointments,
where he focused on accommodating individual senators. Or was it
unconnected? Truman's number of appointments of Catholics and
Jews to the federal judiciary was many times that of Roosevelt, re
flecting their importance in the ruling Democratic coalition (pp.
107-08) The picture emerges of a president more conscious than
his predecessor of the impact judicial appointments have on other
policy choices made by the legislative branch, but more confident of
his ability to understand and influence those choices without
micromanagement that would cost him both legislative support and
his nominees.
.

EISENHOWER
Not surprisingly, the management style of a president who had
grown up in the electoral rough-and-tumble of western Missouri
politics was different from that of his successor.
Dwight
Eisenhower had spent a lifetime in the command structure of a pro
fessional army and was noted for understanding the impact of logis
tics on victory. Both Harry and Ike got along well with
subordinates - few other presidents radiate that comfortable feel
ing of first-name familiarity - and were students of persons and
personalities. But each demonstrated an approach to picking
judges that resembled his own management style. Truman's sit
down-and-deal gave way to Eisenhower's by-the-book. But Eisen
hower understood that there was both a governmental and political
purpose to this exercise.
When Eisenhower took office after twenty years of Roosevelt
and Truman, the judiciary was 77.5% Democratic appointees (p.
112). This level of imbalance would not be matched until Clinton
succeeded twelve years of Presidents Reagan and Bush.8 A former
military man, at first the new president liked judicial nominations to
go through channels. But realizing their dual governmental and
political purpose, he soon directed that judicial nominations be
cleared through the Republican National Committee. As time went
8. Goldman, supra note 3, at 299.
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on and he learned more about the process, he instructed the Attor
ney General to put him in the decisionmaking loop (p. 113). But
Eisenhower became dissatisfied with even this approach as he felt
that he needed to be involved before the final decision was made.
He called for closer consultation with the Justice Department ear
lier in the process. Goldman does not say it, but you come away
with the feeling that Eisenhower was impelled to have the same
influence on who moved up in the judiciary as senior commanders
have on the development of the officer corps. It also seems clear
that he wanted some flexibility so that he could deal with the
Senate.
These suppositions may account for how the use of the ABA
became institutionalized under Eisenhower (p. 137). What better
way to build in the firmness of command structure, yet preserve for
the commander the option of selecting a candidate not of a sena
tor's choosing, than to bring in an institution akin to the Army's
personnel boards? Eisenhower, having directed an Allied coalition,
had an understanding of coalition politics. While the Senate was
Republican during his first two years, Eisenhower then had to deal
with a coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans from 1954
until 1958, when an economic downturn prompted the election of
seventeen new Democratic senators, including many liberals (p.
110). Eisenhower's Justice Department was aggressive in giving its
commander-in-chief the :flexibility of choice he desired even if it
meant stepping on the toes of GOP Senators. Republican minority
leader Everett Dirksen held up and even killed Eisenhower nomi
nations if he felt that Republican senators were not given their due.
Democratic majority leader Johnson once briefly held up all action
on nominations until the Republican National Committee included
one candidate desired by Johnson on the list of nominees.9
Goldman misses some opportunities in this section. Although
he notes Ike's interest in appointing Catholics as tied to party
building (p. 116) he does not consider that side of Eisenhower's
persona as a master of coalition management that made this a natu
ral decision for the military man now come to politics.10 While the
appointment of William Brennan is presented with some context
and detail, the appointment of California Governor Earl Warren as
Chief Justice just nine months into Eisenhower's term is just stated
and passed over without discussion (p. 109-10). There is no consid
eration of the political motives or how it impacted Eisenhower's
relation to the Senate in making selections for the lower courts.
9. Pp. 133-34. Contrast this to Senator Wiley's demand for half the benches in 1946,
discussed above.
10. This may account for his appointment of William Brennan to the Supreme Court.•P.
152.
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This may have been outside the author's scope, but it is something
to pause and think about. Finally, although the "blue slip" was in
vented in the Eisenhower era, there is no mention of it in this
chapter.11
In May 1958, after five years in office, Eisenhower expressed
uncertainty about the proper role of courts in a democracy. He sent
Attorney General William Rogers a lengthy memo asking probing
questions about the courts, legislation by the courts versus decision
making, the federal-state relationship, and the limits to Congress's
control over the courts (p. 125). Rogers responded with a compre
hensive seven-page, single-spaced letter explaining the proper role
of the courts in reviewing legislation, the use of phrases such as
"due process" and "equal protection" in our constitutional frame
work, the use of judicial legislating both as an accurate and as an
oversimplified criticism, and the need for the judiciary, despite the
occasional error, to be independent so that the integrity of the deci
sional process could be maintained (pp. 125-26). This remarkable
exchange reflects well on both Eisenhower and Rogers as they tried
to come to a common understanding so that the man who led the
free world would know what one third of his government was
about.
This same concern led Eisenhower to inquire about the propri
ety of a recess appointment.12 Upon being assured by his Attorney
General that the power could be properly exercised, he did so with
dispatch (pp. 119-20). In choosing his judges Eisenhower displayed
a remarkable lack of ideology. One of his appointees, Judge John
Minor Wisdom, described Eisenhower's style in recruiting and
screening judges as follows: "There is no cataloguing of biases or
prejudices . . . . Instead, what is of concern is whether the man is a
qualified lawyer, knowledgeable, has community standing and judi
cial temperament" (p. 124).
Eisenhower's record of appointments differed significantly from
his predecessors. Over 70% of Ike's first-term judges came from
private practice compared to 26% for Truman. In his second term,
Eisenhower chose 56% from private practice. One third of the first
group and one-half of the second came from medium-to-large firms,
including many prominent firms. By contrast, none of Truman's
first-term appointees came from such firms. Ike appointed no law
professors and, unlike Truman and Roosevelt, no sitting member of
Congress. About 60% of his judges had records of prominent party
activism (p. 151). However, perhaps because of the criteria men11. See ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 23-24; EDWARDS & WAYNE, supra note 5, at 348.
12. "The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the
Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session." U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
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tioned by Judge Wisdom, none of Eisenhower's nominees was re
jected by a vote of the full Senate (p. 152).
KENNEDY
While John Kennedy undoubtedly had an interest in judicial se
lection there are no memos or notes that document his involvement
(p. 158). It appears matters were handled by phone or at lunch with
his brother, the Attorney General, and others with whom he had
close ties. Robert Kennedy said that the President became actively
involved only in about a half-dozen situations where members of
Congress wanted someone other than the prospective nominee (p.
159). Like Truman before him and Johnson afterward, Kennedy
came from the Senate and senators of the President's party therefore
exerted great influence over the selection process (p. 173). Profes
sor Goldman states that no mention of a role for the DNC in judi
cial selection is found in Kennedy's papers (p. 174). Kennedy
continued to utilize the ABA in screening as had Eisenhower.
However, when the ABA lobbied for bipartisan (half-and-half) se
lection, Robert Kennedy thanked it for its evaluative role and
stated that Republicans would be appointed but in no particular
percentage (pp. 177-78).
Although Kennedy faced a Congress dominated by conservative
southern Democrats, he was just as cognizant as Truman and
Eisenhower that one hand washes the other. Kennedy therefore
appointed some Republicans, including three recess appointments
left over from Eisenhower.13 His approach was to arrange pack
ages with Democratic and Republican nominees to gain support
across party lines. A total of eleven Republicans were named in the
three years of the Kennedy Administration (p. 190). In compari
son, only nine Democrats were named in Eisenhower's eight years
(p. 148) and these were often southern "Eisenhower" Democrats
(p. 151).
Shortly after Kennedy took office, seventy-three new judgeships
were created. In a presidential first, Kennedy pledged to appoint
"[m]en and women of unquestioned ability."14 The majority of
these appointees came from private law practice. Many were from
large firms. Only 1.7% of Kennedy and Johnson nominees were
solo practitioners although during those years 35% of the nation's
lawyers practiced solo (p. 193). Kennedy strove for quality appoint
ments and largely succeeded (p. 196). In only one instance did
Kennedy knowingly appoint a segregationist to a circuit court, and
13. Two of these recess appointees were confirmed. The one not confirmed was JFK's
only nominee to be defeated (p. 187 & n.hh) and he was subsequently nominated by Nixon
and confirmed by a still-Democratic Senate (pp. 174-75).
14. However, he only appointed one woman, Sarah Hughes of Texas. P. 180.
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this was after a two-and-one-half-year fight over an Arkansas seat
on the Eighth Circuit (p. 168). He did, however, appoint persons
with public records of racist statements to district courts (p. 167).
Overall ideological orientation was less important than whether
segregationist positions would be taken from the bench (p. 170).
Goldman's account of Kennedy's administration is weak in his
treatment of Kennedy's use of recess appointments, which he used
to put Thurgood Marshall on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
The device of a recess appointment apparently was intended to give
some political cover to Judiciary Committee Chairman James
Eastland of Mississippi, who, according to Robert Kennedy,
delayed appointments but never caused any trouble (p. 183). There
is a lot that is not said in this nonstatement of noninterference. The
Kennedys and Eastland were not strangers to politics. If, as chair
man, Senator Eastland was not causing trouble for a more diverse
class of nominees, then what were the considerations given him in
exchange? Goldman does not explore the subject. Given the
Kennedy penchant for packaging nominees, it is just as easy to
package other commodities - a dam or an air base or a highway
bill for a judge. How these nonjudicial matters fit into the selection
process should not be discounted.
JOHNSON
Like his mentor Roosevelt, former Senate majority leader
Lyndon Johnson micromanaged judicial selection (p. 160). He ap
pointed more law professors (five) than Truman, Eisenhower and
Kennedy combined (p. 194). However, Goldman does not explore
the reason behind this statistic. Was it a reflection of a Roosevel
tian streak in LBJ, or his own career as a teacher, or attachments
between these academics and Democratic politicians? We are left
to wonder at its meaning.
But we do not have to wonder at the meaning of one of
Goldman's other observations. After the passage of civil rights leg
islation, LBJ insisted on knowing the civil rights views of candidates
for the judiciary (p. 170). Purely personal views were not a bar to
appointment, however. Several judges were nominated over the
objections of civil rights leaders (pp. 170-71). Local ABA commit
tees frequently found these nominees to be well-qualified, and the
backing of powerful southern senators whose votes were needed on
other matters led to the usual dealmaking. On June 13, 1967,
Johnson named Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall to the
Supreme Court (p. 171 n.v). For the nation's black leaders this
more than made up for his acceding to the requests of southern
senators on other appointments.
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In 1966, forty-five new judgeships were created and in 1968,
nine new appeals court positions were established (p. 180). The ju
diciary was expanding as the federal government's role in the life of
the nation expanded and as the Congress put more responsibility on
the courts in sustaining that role. This expansion gave the former
Senate majority leader in the White House more pieces with which
to play. He accommodated senators where he could on nomina
tions and expected assistance in return on needed legislation.ts Us
ing this approach, Johnson named nine more Republicans to the
federal courts for a total of twenty in the Kennedy-Johnson era.
This was more than twice the number of Democrats named in
Eisenhower's two terms (p. 195) and reflects how the two senator
presidents grasped the relationship between cooperation and
legislation.
Several runners-up for judgeships in the Kennedy-Johnson years
were subsequently nominated by Nixon. Johnson had four nomina
tions lapse at the end of his last Congress. He renominated all four
after Nixon was elected in November in the belief that Nixon would
defer to him in the same way that JFK deferred to Eisenhower.
Nixon, however, withdrew the nominations. Nevertheless, of the
four, one was again nominated by Nixon, another by Ford, and a
third by Carter, and all were confirmed (pp. 187 n.hh).

NIXON
Richard Nixon, the first attorney to serve as President since
Franklin Roosevelt, faced a Democratic Senate during his entire
presidency. In 1968, opposed by Humphrey on the left and Wallace
on the right, Nixon made a campaign promise to name strict con
structionists to the courts (p. 198). Within a short time after his
election he was able to replace Earl Warren with Warren Burger
and to stage-manage the resignation of Abe Fortas from the
Supreme Court (p. 198). Although the Fortas issue is barely
touched in this book, the Fortas-Haynsworth-Carswell confirmation
battles placed the Supreme Court nomination selection process
squarely on the front burner of American politics, where it remains
to this day.
While Nixon seemed intensely interested in the political ramifi
cations of Supreme Court appointments, he took little or no cogni
zance of the lower federal courts and the impact that individual
nominees would have on either the law or politics. Nixon was more
concerned with issues of grand strategy in both global and domestic
affairs and was bored by the details of implementation (p. 200).
15. This approach can be readily seen in Johnson's working with Republican leader Sena
tor Everett Dirksen to name judges Dirksen desired. P. 173.
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Nominations for the lower federal courts were left up to the Attor
ney General John Mitchell, the Justice Department and more par
ticularly to John Ehrlichman, assistant to the President for domestic
affairs (pp. 202-03). At the outset of his term Nixon gave the ABA
a de facto veto over nominations by agreeing that no one would be
nominated whom the ABA rated "not qualified" (p. 231).
Goldman infers that Nixon and Mitchell - with their Wall Street
experience - believed that the ABA shared their conservative Re
publican values (pp. 214-15).
There are two interesting aspects of Nixon's lower court selec
tions. The first is that he named six African Americans to federal
district court benches. While the politics involved in each individ
ual nomination is fascinating; it is even more interesting to follow
the memos of White House aides as they discuss how to broaden
their appeal to blacks without damaging the Nixon "southern strat
egy" (pp. 222-25).
The second remarkable feature of Nixon's appointments is the
lack of any concerted Democratic effort in the Senate to frustrate
them. This could be seen most clearly as Nixon's presidency drew
to its close. The House was readying to vote on articles of impeach
ment and the Senate was preparing for the trial that would follow.
Yet, as August 1974 opened, only one of Nixon's judicial appointees
was awaiting action in the Senate Judiciary Committee. On August
8, 1974, Richard Nixon nominated three more federal judges. The
next day he resigned. All four of his remaining nominees (two dis
trict judges and two appellate judges) were confirmed by a
Democrat-dominated Senate (p. 226).
FORD
Perhaps because of the brevity of Ford's presidency, Goldman
discusses his judicial nominations in tandem with Nixon's. This ap
proach makes some sense. The demographics, personal back
ground, and ABA and RNC involvement are similar. But it is
appropriate to think of Ford's choices separately. From the begin
ning, Ford attempted to make a break from the style and substance
of Nixon's approach by changing the type of persons who made the
screening and vetting decisions at the Justice Department. He tried
to restore public faith in. a department once headed by the dis
graced Mitchell and Kleindienst by bringing in Edward Levi of the
University of Chicago as Attorney General and U.S. District Judge
Harold Tyler as his deputy (p. 204). This difference in the leader
ship at Justice may account for the fact that there was no change in
the demographic background from Nixon to Ford appointees, but
that there was a change in professional experience and party affilia
tion. Ford relied much more heavily than Nixon on appointees who
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came with previous judicial experience or from prosecutorial ranks.
Likewise, and perhaps because of his legislative leadership experi
ence, he was more open to the appointment of persons identified as
Democrats than Nixon had been (pp. 204-05, 226-29). A number of
the Democrats came with strong Republican senatorial support or
as part of a package that included Republican nominees (p. 213).
Nevertheless� Ford worked closely with party leaders on lower
court nominations. Besides consulting with any affected Republi
can senators, he routinely submitted names to the Republican Na
tional Committee for clearance. Where there were no GOP
senators, he consulted with the state party leaders and elected offi
cials before acting on nominations (p. 212). His term was too brief
for anyone to venture a guess as to Ford's management or person
nel style with regard to judicial nominees. At the end of the Nixon
Ford years, however, a judiciary consisting of 70% Democratic
nominees in 1969 was more than half Republican when Jimmy
Carter came to town (p. 235).
CARTER
For a nonlawyer, President Jimmy Carter displayed a remarka
ble interest and involvement in judicial selection. It may have been
his passion for reform and his engineer-driven desire for regular
order or his tenure in the Georgia Senate and Statehouse. An op
ponent of patronage, Carter pledged himself to the selection of
judges based solely on professional qualifications (p. 238). Carter's
interest lay in the process of selection more than the individuals
selected. Carter was serious about removing patronage and to that
end established a Circuit Judge Nominating Commission by execu
tive order barely four weeks into his term (p. 238). The commission
had a panel from each circuit. The panels had mixed membership
of race and gender and were evenly divided between lawyers and
nonlawyers. The order charged the panels with the task of giving
the president the names of five qualified persons for a court of ap
peals seat within sixty days of being notified of a vacancy. The
President-elect and Attorney General-designate Griffin Bell had
met with Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman James 0. Eastland
in December to discuss changes in judicial selection. Eastland had
tried to hold firm on senatorial prerogatives but had agreed to help
Carter persuade senators to establish merit selection commissions
in their states for district court appointments. He agreed to a nomi
nating commission for the courts of appeal. Before this time only
two states had such nominating commissions. By 1980 there would
be thirty.16
16. Pp. 244, 283. In
290-91.

the Reagan years the nominating commission was disbanded. Pp.
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Carter's approach dramatically opened the process to scrutiny
and eventually produced a broader spectrum of judges to include
women and minorities and reduced the institutional influence of the
ABA, while at the same time professionalizing the federal judiciary
without undermining the quality of nominees by emphasizing nomi
nees with proven judicial experience (pp. 276-81). Carter took a
real interest in how the names came to his desk. The memos from
White House counsel to the President and from the Attorney Gen
eral to the President are annotated with handwritten comments by
Carter. Some approve an arrangement. Others make subtle but
significant changes in the order of the process, with the most signifi
cant ones providing that names being considered will come to the
President before going out for ABA and FBI checks (pp. 244-45).
The most intriguing reading in the Carter chapter concerns the
war between the White House staff and Attorney General Griffin
Bell over who would control selection (pp. 246-49, 254-59). Bell
fought unsuccessfully to keep that control entirely within his hands.
Finally, an uneasy truce was made in which control was shared.
Bell insisted, however, that only the White House counsel himself
would have input and not his assistants. It would probably have
been less contentious had the Attorney General recognized the
very high priority the President had given to recruiting qualified
women and minorities and had taken steps himself to implement
that goal in the early months of the administration. When names of
qualified minority and women nominees did not appear in the first
year, Carter was heavily criticized in the press and by supporters.
His staff reacted by wresting control from the Attorney General,
whose performance they felt had subjected their chief to attack.
Carter's great opportunity both to reform the process and to
transform the makeup of the courts came from the Omnibus Judge
ship Act of 1978 (pp. 241-44). Reflecting the increasing federal
court docket and the federalization of much of the criminal law,
Congress created 117 new federal trial judges and thirty-five new
appellate judges. The numbers alone meant that there would be
room both for senators and representatives to try to accommodate
patronage needs and for the President to put minorities and women
on the federal bench.
Carter largely achieved his process-oriented objectiyes. True to
his word on patronage, for example, he did not appoint any close
friends to the bench. Goldman observes that Carter had no per
sonal agenda and there is no evidence that he even suggested a pos
sible judicial candidate for any vacancy (p. 260). As to party
considerations, the Attorney General stopped references to a nomi
nee's political affiliations in April 1978 and Carter himself never
submitted any of his nominations to the Democratic National Com-
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mittee for clearance (p. 264). This measure of openness was re
flected in the Senate where, beginning in 1979 with Senator
Kennedy assuming the Judiciary Committee chairmanship, blue
slips could no longer be used to block action on a nomination.
Every nomination would be considered, and a home-state senator's
dissatisfaction was now just another factor for the committee to
consider (p. 263). Candidate Ronald Reagan promised to continue
Carter's progress and to seek out women for appointment to the
federal courts to achieve "a better balance" (p. 284).
REAGAN

Ronald Reagan, like Carter a former governor, was as detached
from the selection process as Carter had been involved. But the
Reagan Administration came to Washington with a firm grasp on
its political ideology and its underlying belief system. This ideology
would guide judicial appointments. Unlike the Carter administra
tion, implementation under Reagan was not overseen by the Presi
dent, but by Attorney General William French Smith, presidential
counselor Edwin Meese III, and White House counsel Fred Field
ing (pp. 286-91). They abolished the commission approach of the
Carter years but insisted that three to five names be submitted to
the White House for each vacancy to give them more flexibility (p.
290). An Office of Legal Policy was created at the Justice Depart
ment, hea<:led by an Assistant Attorney General. The office be
came the clearinghouse for judicial nominations. A special counsel
for judicial selection was also created. These officers, the AG, and
the White House officials became the "Working Group on Ap
pointments" chaired by Fielding. They institutionalized a formal
and active role for the White House in the process (pp. 291-92). As
in every administration before and since, they set about to appoint
judges of like mind with the chief executive.
Reagan's process differed from Carter's approach in two
marked respects. First, otherwise qualified persons would not be
considered unless they shared the administration's judicial philoso
phy (p. 290). Second, the Reagan Administration abandoned the
merit selection vehicles put in place, which were ironically similar
to those Reagan himself had used as California's governor (pp. 287,
289).
The importance of the Working Group and its interview process
(pp. 303-05) cannot be overemphasized. To a degree not seen
before, Reagan turned the selection process over to these subordi
nates and particularly to his longtime friend Ed Meese (pp. 291,
299-302). The Working Group made judicial appointments a part
of the president's domestic policy. Reagan made phone calls to
those who were selected asking them to serve - a technique that
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was not only flattering, but certain to reinforce to the appointee
that he was a Reagan appointee (p. 294).
There were several bumps on this road to staffing the courts.
The most notable concerned the conflict between Reagan's cam
paign commitment to appoint women and the desire of the conserv
atives for ideological purity. Female appointees were automatically
suspect because of equal rights and abortion issues. This conflict
came to a head with the recommendation to appoint the general
counsel of Hallmark, Judith Whittaker, as a federal judge in Mis
souri (pp. 299, 320, 330-33). Whittaker had taken no position on
abortion or other political issues, but she was thought to support
the Equal Rights Amendment. Despite high marks from the ABA,
the support of prominent Missouri Republicans, and her own GOP
bona fides, her perceived support for the ERA was enough to fo
ment a right-wing attack. Iowa Lieutenant Governor Terry
Branstad and party activist and fundraiser Richard Viguerie labeled
her a Democrat and pro-abortionist. The power of unfounded
smears by attackers who did not know their victim was quickly ap
parent. Meese led the Working Group to conclude that the
Whittaker nomination should be dropped because she lacked, as a
perplexed deputy attorney general explained, "broad-based sup
port" (p. 333).
Even with the Senate firmly in Republican hands, not all
Reagan nominees were confirmed. Jefferson Sessions III was
named to a federal bench in Alabama, but ran into trouble on civil
rights issues; even after four hearings, the nomination could not be
saved.17
When Reagan's administration encountered opposition to a
nomination it truly desired, it was willing to push. Two examples
are the eventually successful fights to confirm Dan Manion to the
Seventh Circuit and Alex Kozinski to the Ninth (pp. 309-14). In
another unusual confirmation struggle with a Republican senator in
a Republican-controlled Senate, the administration found its choice
for the Eighth Circuit blocked by South Dakota's James Abdnor.
Senator Abdnor was trying to end a twenty-two-year drought for
his state on that court. Unable to persuade Abdnor, the Republi
can leadership changed the rules in midsession so that a senator
could no longer place a "hold" on a judicial nominee from another
state (pp. 321-22). That change occurred in 1983. Today, the
Republican-controlled Senate has gone back to its old custom al
lowing cross-state blockage.
17. Pp. 308·09. He is now a United States Senator and:a member of the committee that
rejected him. The author does not tell us if this is a first, but in today's climate it may become
an increasingly attractive option for unsuccessful nominees.
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Reagan's efforts were remarkably successful in aiding him to
reshape the lower federal courts. He appointed a record seventy
eight appellate and 290 district judges. Like Carter he was helped
by a judgeship bill that created eighty-five new judges and by a Sen
ate that was in friendly hands for six of his eight years. Also like
Carter he kept the ABA at arm's length and like Roosevelt he tried
to make his judicial appointments an extension of his domestic pol
icy. He was aided by a staff who understood this purpose and en
thusiastically backed its implementation. Reagan, like FDR,
wanted to reshape the courts not to reflect his vision but to share it
and, like his onetime hero, he did it. But, like every president from
Washington to Clinton and beyond, Reagan's success waxed and
waned. Not simply because other presidents and Senates come af
ter him, but because the thing that he leaves as a legacy - an in
dependent judiciary
will itself change as the issues of each new
day come before it and seek answers to questions previously
unasked.
,-

CONCLUSION

This is an eye-opening book about a process that has been in
place virtually out of sight since the beginning of the Republic and
which, on balance, has worked rather well. There seems to be a
natural ebb and flow with the checks-and-balances-system of the
framers preventing any party, no matter how long it dominates the
executive or the legislative branches, from dominating the third
branch. This will comfort those in either party who have feared
otherwise.
The system has worked well in modem times except for the
breakdown in the Truman years and the analogous situation today
to which Goldman alludes in his summing up (pp. 364-65). Both
political reality and pressure from a citizenry that rejects the notion
that the courts are merely another political branch have served to
pl'.otect the judiciary from ideologues of the left and the right. The
historical overview of the process also demonstrates the wisdom of
a cardinal rule of practical politics, "Never create or assert an offi
cial prerogative that could not be safely entrusted to your
adversaries. "18
Goldman has produced a comprehensive, well-organized and
crisply written research work with excellent tables for any scholar
or student of the American judiciary. It ends in 1988 and leaves the
reader eager to know how Presidents Bush and Clinton handled
18.

Fein

Bruce Fein, The Chief Justice vs. Hatch, WASH. TIMES, Jan.
assistant attorney general in the Reagan administration.

was
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judicial selection. I hope I will have the opportunity to review the
sequel.
I can just imagine how the book will start. Professor Goldman
will refer to his previous book and the fact that it covered a span of
fifty-five years and seven presidents. He will remark on the smooth
transitions that occurred when two of these presidents died and a
third resigned, each to be replaced by a man very different than the
president the country had elected. He will say that for nearly two
hundred years the process worked reasonably well.
And then he must begin to write about the unprecedented crisis
that we are only now beginning to understand. He will write about
a group of men who, having had the unfettered power to select fed
eral judges during the Reagan years, tried to cling to that power
during the Bush years. Further frustrated by the election of Clin
ton, they viewed the-1994 election of the Republican senate as their
private restoration to presidential power. In what may one day
prove to be the biggest constitutional scandal of the Clinton era,
this unprecedented shadow government of former Republican offi
cials appears to have conspired with current officeholders to disrupt
the entire judicial nomination process. In short, they were captured
for posterity on their own videotape trading blackballs for
contributions.19
The book may have a footnote about the nominee who exposed
the shocking tape. It will be interesting to leam · what became of
him.

19. See Judicial Selection Monitoring Project, videotape and prospectus accompanying
letter from Robert H. Bork, Sept. 9, 1997 (on file with author)(representing contributions to
JSMP as tax-deductible); Judical Selection Monitoring Project, Memorandum of Commit
ment to Paul Weyrich (same) (on file with author). See also Weinstein, supra note 2.

